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measures in progress. First, the 2010 
federal Budget replaced the input subsidy 
in petroleum products and gas, with a 
direct subsidy to marketing companies at 
the point of sale. e 2011 Budget con-
tained an identical policy measure for the 
fertiliser subsidy. Second, a new system of 
social security, the ‘Unique Identication 
Number’, began to be put in place, which 
aims to provide every Indian citizen with 
a unique number upon the collection of 
his or her biometric data, through which 
all direct transfers will be made in the 
future. is system attempts to overcome 
problems such as the exclusion of informal 
sector workers by requiring only national-
ity to be proved, and by linking it to 
informal sector work programmes such as 
the National Rural Employment Guaran-
tee. Although an immense exercise that is 
likely to be susceptible to problems, it may 
reduce leakages from the illegal duplica-
tion of identity. e system was trialled 
in 2011, and was scheduled for launch 
in March 2012. It has, inevitably, run 
into delays. Finally, a signicant reform 
in taxation, the Direct Tax Code, was 
due to come into force during 2012. is 
includes a Goods and Services Tax, which 
will allow for a unied market, whilst 
maintaining the scal autonomy of states. 
is could further inuence scal policy 
in relation to energy subsidies, but it is as 
of now unclear how the energy sector will 
be aected. 
As before, it can be argued that recent 
reform measures are part of a wider 
transition in the Indian economy. During 
this transition, as distortions mount, 
parts of the system are modied, usually 
in the broad direction of liberalisation 
and reform. But partial reform oen has 
the eect of displacing the problems, for 
example from upstream to the consuming 
sectors, presenting new policy challenges, 
requiring further changes. e current 
situation is, arguably, a stage on the way. 
Although there is reason to be optimistic, 
it is a fragile transition. Indian policy-
makers currently face rising international 
oil prices, a depreciating Rupee, a poten-
tial slowing of GDP growth (estimated 
to be down to 7 percent for 2011) and 
growing public discontent. With the 
recent defeat of the ruling Congress 
Party in State Assembly elections, and 
a General Election fast approaching 
in 2014, the longevity of these reform 
measures is likely to be severely tested in 
the next couple of years. 
As an economy where the state 
continues to exercise control over the 
procurement of a wide range of goods 
and services, China oers a fascinating 
example of how economic necessity, 
mostly as a result of rapid growth in 
manufacturing, has forced the state to 
abandon the large-scale subsidisation of 
petrochemical products. 
Recent data from the IEA show that 
China’s subsidisation of oil is among the 
lowest of developing nations, having fallen 
from US$ 27 billion in 2007 to just US$ 
7.77 billion in 2010. e withdrawal 
of subsidies has had a dramatic eect 
on state-owned reners, who had long 
beneted from a complex system of price 
subsidies for crude oil inputs and taris 
and quotas on imported petrochemical 
products. eir withdrawal has meant 
that the crude oil purchased by China’s 
reneries is now priced close to the 
international price, but the retention of 
state control over oil and petrochemical 
product prices has meant that it is oen 
state-owned reners who are forced to 
absorb the costs of this adjustment. e 
result is that China’s reneries have 
faced market prices long before a rening 
infrastructure appropriate for the needs 
of large-scale oil rening could be put 
in place. e following describes how 
the early removal of subsidies oered a 
powerful incentive for enterprise reform; 
but how it has also hindered the ability 
of reneries to overcome longstanding 
capacity and production constraints. 
China’s Petrochemical Sector 
In theory the gradual phasing out of state 
price subsidies and the benchmarking 
of production against international 
prices alongside the reduction of taris 
in product markets should have enabled 
China’s petrochemical sector to improve 
its e!ciency. Indeed over the past decade 
China has achieved a remarkable increase 
in rening capacity. Its aggregate rening 
capacity increased from 5407 thousand 
barrels daily or 6.5 percent of global ren-
ing capacity in 2000, to 10,121 thousand 
barrels daily or 11 percent of global 
rening capacity. China is now second 
only to the USA in terms of global ren-
ing capacity. China’s position is such that 
it is now the principal driver of increases 
in global rening capacity. Of the 0.7 
million barrels per day increase in global 
rening capacity in 2010, 91 percent 
(or 0.642 million barrels per day) was 
accounted for by China. What is surpris-
ing is that despite the impressive capacity 
increases, China’s rening infrastructure 
continues to appear poorly equipped to 
deal with large-scale oil rening. Foreign 
participation in the sector remains low 
and many domestic reneries are small in 
size, geographically dispersed and suer 
from the historical problems of low and 
variable throughput levels. 
China’s growth has had two specic 
impacts on the petrochemical sector. 
First, the upstream or exploration part 
of the sector has no longer been able to 
fully supply the downstream or rening 
part. In 2010, in order to meet domestic 
demand China imported 4710 thousand 
barrels daily of crude oil, equivalent to 
12.5 percent of global crude imports. 
China’s largest rener Sinopec could no 
longer expect to meet its crude oil demand 
through self-supply. In 2009, Sinopec 
imported some 75 percent of the crude oil 
for its rening business from international 
suppliers.
Secondly, di!culties in increasing 
rening capacity have meant that 
domestic capacity alone could no 
longer match demand. State-owned 
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reneries typically sought to increase 
capacity through acquiring rening 
capacity from their state-owned ministry 
level parent companies or by acquiring 
smaller production units. As demand 
increased, expanding capacity via internal 
acquisitions was no longer appropriate 
to meet market demand. By 2010, China 
imported 1253 thousand barrels daily of 
rened products, equivalent to 8.1 percent 
of global imports. ese pressures led to 
an early erosion of the privileged status of 
petrochemicals as purchasers of subsidised 
crude oil and a subsequent opening of the 
sector to international markets. 
Pricing Reforms
China’s oil pricing policy has largely 
evolved in line with its increasing in-
volvement in global manufacturing. 
Benchmarking the price of oil and 
gas to international prices became an 
economic necessity once China became 
a net importer of crude oil in 1993. 
e increasing demands of industry for 
petrochemical-based inputs alongside 
the failure of domestic state-owned oil 
companies to discover new oil supplies 
of su!cient quantity meant that the 
subsidising of reners was no longer 
economically viable. is was to impact 
not just on the margins of reners, but 
also and as a consequence, the extent to 
which they would be able to maintain and 
increase production throughputs. 
Prior to 1993, petrochemical enter-
prises faced a three tier pricing system for 
crude oil requirements. is consisted of 
a price heavily subsidised by the state (a 
state low price), a less heavily subsidised 
price (a state high price), and an unsubsi-
dised market price. For example, in 1992 
the state low price for crude oil from 
Daqing and Shengli oilelds was RMB265 
per ton, while the state high price for oil 
from Daqing and Shengli was RMB621 
and RMB544 respectively. is compared 
with an average market price of RMB 
1000 per ton. In 1993, the pricing system 
was reformed to reect market conditions 
and all subsidised oil was charged at the 
state high price. is coincided with 
China’s rst year as a net importer of oil. 
Up until 2001, crude oil prices were 
generally updated monthly on the basis of 
Singapore prices. For example, between 
November 1999 and August 2000, the 
state raised oil prices on six occasions in 
an attempt to keep pace with internation-
al developments and support enterprise 
protability. Such adjustment encouraged 
the hoarding of inventories as enterprises 
could easily predict future price move-
ments. e decision in October 2001, to 
switch to the issuing of guidance prices 
based on prices in three international 
markets therefore represented an impor-
tant shi in regulatory policy. Guidance 
prices are calculated on a transparent 
formula thereby allowing enterprises more 
certainty. Although the state still retained 
some control over prices, the new pricing 
structure was su!ciently exible to allow 
enterprises price products according to 
the price of inputs. is has been particu-
larly important since 1996 when under 
GATT domestic reners faced increasing 
competition from imported petrochemi-
cal products. For China’s petrochemical 
enterprises, this had the eect of reducing 
the taris on imported products in their 
product markets from a range of 9 percent 
to 40 percent, to a range of 5 percent to 
22 percent. Under the WTO taris on 
imported ethylene, synthetic resins and 
bres, and gasoline were scheduled to fall 
signicantly aer 2003, 2008, 2004, and 
2001 respectively.
Under the current pricing mechanism 
in place since 2009, the National Develop-
ment and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
can consider changing benchmark 
retail prices of oil products when the 
international crude price rises or falls by a 
daily average of 4 percent over 20 days. In 
theory this provides reneries with a cred-
ible and transparent pricing mechanism. 
In practice fuel prices remain a politically 
contentious issue and price adjustments 
can be more arbitrary with upward and 
downward adjustment delayed due to 
political considerations. It also means 
that the margins of reneries are still aer 
more than 30 years of economic reform, 
ultimately dependent on government 
pricing policy. For example in 2000 it 
was reported that in Beijing, the local 
government started providing taxi drivers 
with 100 Yuan in subsidies a month to 
help defray rising fuel costs. In 2003, 
China delayed adjusting prices, as it was 
feared that higher fuel prices might hurt 
some of the country’s more vulnerable 
industries as a result of the SARs crisis. In 
2011, China raised prices for gasoline, jet 
fuel and diesel reecting the rising global 
prices of these products. But the increases 
were slower than the increase in the price 
of international crude. For petrochemical 
companies this meant that they were un-
able to pass on the full cost of price rises.
Capacity Constraints and 
Squeezed Margins
Although the early removal of subsidies 
forced reneries to benchmark their prices 
to international trends, it has not resolved 
the problems of low capacities and variable 
throughputs. If anything the current 
pricing structure has created the incen-
tive for reneries to reduce throughputs 
and slow production in order to protect 
already slim prots margins. It also creates 
the political incentive for the state to 
pass on international price increases to 
reners. e magnitude of this problem 
is succinctly illustrated in Table 1, which 
shows the primary distillation capac-
ity of Sinopec’s largest reneries. e 
shaded areas represent reneries that are 
regarded as meeting international capacity 
standards. Even those larger reneries that 
meet international minimum capacity 
standards continue to suer from variable 
throughput levels. Low capacity utilisa-
tion of reneries has been a historical 
feature of China’s petrochemical sector. 
Although the sector achieved considerable 
improvements following the international 
listings of reneries in the 1990s, there 
still appear considerable variations across 
individual reneries. For Sinopec, China’s 
largest rener, throughput as a percentage 
of primary distillation capacity declined 
from 85.8 percent in 2007 to 80.1 
percent in 2009 even though overall yield 
increased from 93.9 to 94.5 percent over 
the same period. 
e data in Table 1 indicate that 
although reneries have been successful in 
bringing on-stream new rening capacity, 
market conditions and in particular pres-
sures on rening margins and prots, may 
mean that the historical problem of low 
capacity utilisation remains. Although 
large state enterprises in China’s oil and 
gas sector continued to account for a 
large and increasing proportion of state 
enterprise prots (31 percent of all SOE 
prots in 2010 up from 19 percent in 
2009), the same is not true for the down-
stream rening side. Enterprises involved 
in petroleum, coking and fuel procession 
account for about 7 percent of total 
SOE prots and have substantially lower 
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returns on assets and sales than those 
on the upstream side. Survey data from 
China’s State Statistical Bureau for 2011 
indicate that the oil rening, coking and 
nuclear-fuel processing, communications 
equipment and computer manufacturing 
sectors saw prots plunge 83.9 percent in 
the period January to September 2011. 
e suspicion is that the current pricing 
structure allows the state to delay adjust-
ing prices and force reneries to absorb 
the cost of any change in international 
prices thereby further putting pressure on 
rening margins. Pressures on margins 
make it di!cult to justify running 
reneries at full capacity, particularly if it 
results in losses.  
Going Forward
e removal of state subsidies and the 
reduction of taris on a wide range of 
petrochemical products have led to a 
remarkable and unusual opening up of 
China’s state-driven petrochemical sector. 
But it has also created considerable uncer-
tainties, particularly in terms of the future 
role of the state as both price regulator 
and owner as well as how it intends to 
create a modern rening infrastructure 
capable of supplying China’s rapidly 
growing industrial base. e removal of 
subsidies and the early opening up of the 
sector to imports has gone hand-in-hand 
with a dramatic expansion in capacity and 
improvements in e!ciency. But it has also 
exposed reneries to volatile international 
prices without addressing the problems 
of small-scale and variable throughput. It 
also exposes reners to political risk as the 
state retains the ability to force reners to 
absorb increases in international prices. 
Addressing this will require important 
political compromises in a sector that has 
a long history as a strategic part of China’s 
state-owned industrial base. 
Table 1: Primary Distillation Capacity of Sinopec’s refineries (Unit: Million barrels/year)
Refinery 1998 1999 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009
Throughput as % primary 
capacity (2009)
Maoming 95.85 95.85 95.85 95.8 95.8 95.8 95.8 95.5 96.3
Zhenhai 67.45 85.2 85.2 142.0 142.0 142.0 142.0 169.69 80.3
Qilu 74.55 74.55 74.55 74.55 74.55 74.55 74.5 74.55 96.2
Yanshan 67.45 56.8 56.8 56.8 56.8 56.8 92.3 92.3 83.1
Guangzhou 54.67 54.67 54.67 54.67 54.67 93.72 93.7 93.72 84.8
Gaoqiao 51.83 51.83 51.83 78.1 78.1 78.1 78.1 78.1 95.5
Jinling 49.7 74.55 74.55 92.3 92.3 92.3 92.3 92.3 95.4
Tianjin 35.5 35.5 35.5 0 0 0 39.0 88.75 34.4
Yangzi 39.0 39.0 39.0 56.8 56.8 56.8 56.8 56.8 100.0
Shanghai 37.6 44.7 44.7 62.5 99.4 99.4 99.4 99.4 62.9
Changling 35.5 35.5 35.5 0 0 0 0 0
Luovang 35.5 35.5 35.5 0 0 0 46.1 56.8 80.0
Jingmen 35.5 35.5 35.5 0 0 0 0 0
Wuhan 0 35.5 56.8 56.3
Fujian 0 28.4 85.2 58.3
Hainan 0 56.8 56.8 102.5
Qingdao 0 0 71 90.0
Others 35.5 35.5 – 388.4 386.2 460.8 331.6 343.6
Total 715.7 754.7 719.2 1101.9 1136.7 1250.3 1362.5 1611.7
Notes: a) Converted using 7.1 barrels per tonne for Chinese Crude. All figures rounded to one decimal place. b) Refineries meeting the international capacity standard are highlighted. The 
international capacity standard is of the order of 10 million tons of crude per year equating to approximately 71 million barrels per year 
Sources: Form 20-F Sinopec various years
A Radical Reform
Removing fuel subsidies is a tricky busi-
ness. Many governments try and fail, oen 
having to backtrack in the face of public 
protest or political opposition. Bolivia 
and Nigeria are only the latest examples. 
Price increases do not have to be huge to 
provoke opposition. Iran had that experi-
ence a few years ago when a government-
decreed 20 percent increase was rolled 
back aer a year by a parliament 
dominated by a rival political current. It 
is all the more remarkable, therefore, that 
in December 2010 Iran itself managed to 
put in place one of the most radical fuel 
subsidy reforms ever attempted anywhere 
and make it stick. Prices of various fuels 
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